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It\ TllE SUPRHiE COURT 
OF THE: STATE OF UTAH 
S. H. BE:NNION, 
vs. 
GULF OIL CORPORATION, a 
Penns}lvania Corporation and 
tne U'rAH STA'l'E BOARD OF OIL, 
GAS AND an agency of 
the State of Utah, 
Case No. 19144 
Defendants/Respondents 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The three issues presented in this petition ior 
ienearing are: 
1. Whether the court was misled by Plaintitf-Appellant 
into believing that the Board's Order was foundeo 
upon facts that, in truth, were irrelevant and 
extraneous to the roatter before the Board ana, as 
such, were unconsidered by the Board in arriving at 
the decision under review. 
2. Whether the Court misapprehended the Board's 
ir1ter1Jretation of, and its express intention to 
rel:; upon, the operative statute. 
3. Whether the Court overlooked important Utah case 
la1' which establishes the standard of review to be 
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test. (R. 199.) During the examination of Mr. Anthony regarding 
this Voda #2 well the following exchange took place: 
MR. CHAIRMAN: You don't even know 
if it is going to be a commercial 
well? 
MR. ANTHONY: No, we don't know 
that. The only thing we do know is 
that it was making approximately 60 
barrels of oil. We have no idea of 
what the extent of the reservoir 
is. We can't know at this time. 
we realize that this whole field 
is--apparently the reservoir due to 
the geological structure of the 
thing--it's almost impossible to 
determine what's going to happen 
from one well to the next as far as 
correlating sands ana production. 
(Reply Brief, p. 10, Slip Op. at 4, 
R. 203-4, attached.) 
In Bennion's Reply Brief, this quote was taken out of 
the context of the transcript from the April 30, 1981 hearing and 
held out as describing the Albert Smith #2. This was a critical 
misstatement. Gulf had previously established the fact of 
commercial production for the Smith #2 with Mr. Anthony's earlier 
testimony. (R. 196.) As a result of this hearing, the Board 
granted Gulf's uncontested request to designate the Smith 12 as 
the unit well. The Board took no action to redesignate the Voda 
#2 as the unit well for its respective drilling unit. 
There were two more hearings in Cause No. 139-20(B) 
occurring on September 24, 1981 and October 22, 1981. The status 
of the Smith i2 as the unit well did not arise during these 
hearings. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the instant case, this Court, in apparent reliance 
upon the misstatement by Plaintiff-Appellant that the Smith #2 
well was a poorly producing well, erred in determining that the 
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining acted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner in designating the Smith #2 as the one permitted 
production well for the drilling unit. In fact, testimony 
introduced to the Board and supported by production records 
established the Smith #2 well as a highly productive well. The 
quote appearing on page 10 of Plaintiff-Appellant's Reply Brief 
and again on page 4 of this Court's opinion in this matter is 
taken directly from testimony regarding the Josephine Voda i2-
19C5 well, a marginally productive well unrelated to the matter 
betore this Court. (R. 203.) 
Furthermore this Court, apparently unaware of the 
Board's Order in Cause No. 139-20 (R. 6), erroneously concluded 
that the broad declaration of public interest contained in Utah 
Code Ann. § 40-6-1 was the sole authority upon which the Board 
relied in designating the Smith #2 as the unit well. In fact, 
the order in this Cause is replete with statutory support for the 
Board's action. 
Finally, a great degree of deference must be afforded 
the Board's findings of basic fact and its construction of its 
operative statute. If there is any basis in reason for a 
statutory interpretation and any substantive evidence whatsoever 
to support a finding of fact, the Board's order must be 
sustained. 
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pet i t ion f or r e b r in y an u u f f l r ; t r 1 c , i u ' ::. Gr u t.:' i ::_ l n C <J u ::__; ..._. 
Nos. 139-20 anci 139-20(bl. 
IN APPAAl::NT l<f.LIAJ;CE. UPOI; FACTS 
INCIDEt;T TO AN EXTRA!,EOUS ISSUI::, 
THE COURT INCOR]{ECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 'I'HE BOARD'S 
ORDER DESIGNATING THE SECOND WELL 
AS THE PRODUCTIOt' WELL 
In the course of the April 30, 1981 hearing betore the 
Board, the status ot 1...1>'.Q test wells was discussed, the Albert 
i2-8C5 anu the Josephine Voaa #2-19C5. It is critical to 
the installt case that the Court correctly 1-'erceive that the 
evioence betore the Boaru Oil 30, 1981 revealed that the 
Smith 12 1.;as an overwhelr;ungly gooo producer. The Srni th 2 
prouuc:eu 16 ,238 barrels ot oil, 16 ,977 rnc:t ot gas alld 600 barrels 
u1 watu uc.tlthJ 46 aa:,s ot testing in January anu February, 1981. 
( R. 16 9. J The Sr .. 1th fl prouuceo 1,458 barrels ot oil, 2,729 rncc 
of gas ana 17,851 barrels of water curing 58 days of prociuct1on 
in the 11rst twc ot 1981. 
which sL:ppurt the Euara' s oec1s1or, to re-cies1g1Jate the Src1ith it2 
as the pruuuc·t1un we1l tor the L<n1t. Tne LVluence betore the 
Boar a in April Gl 19 81 sho;.·eo t:he Sri tl1 ii2 "'c il tu L<11duubteal; uc 
gas than tht. S111 u, il. 
1 -''il 10 ut Pl air,t1ft-Ap!Jellant' s Reply Brief. It was unknown at 
t l1t' time of the Aµr il hearing if that well would be a commercial 
f L<'uucer as il hau pruouceci only 60 barrels of oil in an initial 
11-hour test. 
Al though the stateruent a!Jpertaining to the perplexing 
characteristics of the reservoir geology is applicable to all 
u11lling endeavors in the Altamont Bluebell fiela, the facts 
incident to the poor initial proauction is specific to the 
Josephine Voda #2. As a result of this out-of-context quote, the 
Court found that there was no economic justification for the 
Board's action. Based upon the detection of these misapplied 
fctcts, the Board urges the Court to reconsider its conclusion on 
tli1s issue, grant this petition for rehearing and affirm the 
Boara's oraer designating the Smith i2 as the unit production 
wll l. 
POINT II 
THE COURT, IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
BOARD FOUNDED ITS ORDER SOLJ::LY UPON 
ONE SUBSECTION OF THE OPERATIVE 
STATUTE, APPARENTLY OVERLOOKED THE 
EXTENSIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY CITED 
IN THE BOARD'S ORDER IN CAUSE NO. 
139-20 
There are three orders ot the Board in this matter, all 
,_,t which are attached to Plaintiff-Appellant's Complaint filea 
with the trial court. (R. 6-21.) The tirst orcier, 139-20, was 
as a result ot the September 25, 1980 emergency Board 
r1.:,i:1rir1c;. This hearing was pror11ptea by questions regarding 
, LatuLurj authority hypothesized to the Board by the Third 
i " "t 1 i c t cu u 1 t ir 1 c' i a enc t o a r,w t i on t or a pr el i mi na r y in J un ct ion 
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filed by Plaintiff-Appellant against the drilling of the Sr.iith 
i2. 
In response to the District Court, the Board 
interpreted several portions of the relevant statute which it is 
empowered to administer by citing and underscoring what, in the 
Board's view, were the pivotal phrases. Two critical 
subsections, §§ 40-6-6(c) and (d), were expressly included as 
confirming the Board's authority to authorize the drilling of 
infill test wells. 
This Court has apparently overlooked this first order 
of the Board as illustrated by its observation that "[tlhe 
Board's order in the instant case did not purport to comply with 
!Utah Code Ann. §40-6-6Cdll." (Slip op. at 3l. In fact, the 
Board clearly complied with its interpretation of the cited 
section that only one well per unit may oil and gas at 
any given time. This is a practical interpretation born of the 
knowledge that any other characterization would preclude the 
accepted and widespread practice of drilling subsequent unit 
wells in cases of an initial dry hole or as a result of the 
plugging and abandonment of the initial well due to depletion. 
The statutory "uniform plan" language emphasized by the Court for 
such additional wells as the Board deems necessary does not 
preclude the Board from instituting such a plan gradually. This 
well was but the first step in the Board's stated goal of 
recovering more of the heretofore unrecoverable oil and gas in 
the reservoir. (R. 8, 9.) 
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The statutory foundation tor administrative action was 
precisely set out in the declaratory-type Board ruling in reply 
to the District Court's inquiry. The Board therefore urges this 
Court to reconsider its holding in this case, grant the petition 
for rehearing and affirm the Board's orders in this matter. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT HAS OVERLOOKED OR 
MISAPPREHENDED IMPORTANT UTAH CASE 
LAW WHICH ESTABLISHES THE STANDARD 
OF REVIEW TO BE AFFORDED TO ORDERS 
OF THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
In Bennion v. Shell, 675 P.2d 1135 {Utah 1983), this 
Court held that the separate standards of review enunciated in 
of Aciroinistrative Services v. Public Service 
Corrunission, 658 P.2d 601, 607-12 {Utah 1983) are "applicable to 
district court review of the decisions of the Board." Bennion v. 
fillitl..l, above at 1140. In Bennion, this Court went on to adopt 
the rule that "no presumption of correctness" would be afforded 
to the district court's aecision but that this Court would review 
the decision of the Board "just as if the appeal had come 
directly from the agency." Bennion v. Shell, above at 1140. 
There are two levels of review set out in the 
Aarninistrative Services case which are applicable to the instant 
case. First, Board findings on questions of basic fact should be 
afforded the "greatest degree of deference" and should be 
affirmed it they are supported by "evidence of any substance 
whatever". Admin. Serv. at 609. Second, the application of 
these findings on questions of basic fact to the law of the case 
and the Boara's interpretations of the "operative provisions of 
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the statutory law it is empowered to administer" fall within the 
category of the reasonableness of the order. Id at 610. Great 
weight is to be given to Board conclusions on matters in this 
second classification and its decision set aside "only if it is 
outside 'the tolerable limits of reason.'" Id at 612, quoting 
Silver Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service Conunission, 30 
Utah 2d 44, 512 P.2d 1327 (1973). 
The Board's underlying finding of basic fact following 
the April 30, 1981 hearing that the Smith #2 is capable of 
producing substantially more oil and gas than the Smith #1 is a 
finding supported by testimony in connection with completion and 
testing data (R. 196-97) and production records for the two wells 
for January and February, 1981. As a result of this substantive 
evidence, the Board finding regarding the production status of 
the two Smith wells should be affirmed. 
Although Court review of findings of basic fact are at 
issue, the primary matter of concern is the level of review that 
has been applied to the Board's interpretation of the "operative 
provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to administer". 
(Admin. Serv., above at 610.) Nowhere in that order does the 
Board attempt to characterize general law. Each statutory 
section cited is drawn from the law incident to the regulation 0£ 
oil and gas. These interpretations are certainly within "the 
tolerable limits of reason," Acimin. Serv. at 612 citing 
Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comrn'n, above, and the 
Board's conclusions deserve affirmance by this Court. 
-10-
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, it appears that 
the Court misapprehended certain facts and either misapprehended 
or overlooked significant case law in determining that the 
Board's order lacked evidentiary and statutory support. 
Therefore, this petition for rehearing should be granted and the 
orders of the Board in Cause Nos. 139-20 and 139-20(B) affirmed. 
19 85. 
Respectfully submitted this IC""- day of September, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
;JJr lrtt!Uv.>f21uiV 
BARBARA W. ROBERTS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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J. The Board has jurisdiction over the matter in dispute pursuant to 
the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, Section 40-6-1 et seq., U.C.A., 19S3. 
2. The Boa.rd has authority to issue an emergency order in this matter 
pursuant to Section 40-6-S(c), U.C.A., 1953, which provides: 
When an emergency requiring immediate action is found 
bv the Commission to exist, it is authon::ed to issue an 
order 1r-·1thout notice or hearing, which shall be 
effective upon promulgation, provided that no such order 
remain effective for more than fifteen (15) days. 
3. Jn th.Jt the: Third Judicial District Court has been requested to 
enjoin the .orcrat1on of Gulf's Albert Smith 2-8CS .,..ell and has continued such 
proccedinp until the Board rules on this matter at the September 25, 1980 
Board He3ring, the Board finds that an emergency situation exists requiring 
immediate admir.istratl\'e action nnd therefore issues the following Findings 
of Fact, Cone 1 us ions of La"l<I· and Order. 
1. On $C'ptembcr 20, 19-2, the Bo:ird entered an Order in Cause No. 139-8 
spacrng the }OC3tion anJ drilling of wells 0n 640 acre u:iits in the Altamont 
!Huebcll Field, Duchesne County, Utah, and requiring "that no more than one 
\.'ell shall he drilled on any such unit for the production of oil, gas and 
associated hydrocarbons from the common source of supply ... " 
2. On AuJ:lJSt :?S, 1980, the D1nsion granted approval to Gulf to drill 
the Albert s-.ith 2-SCS as an infill test .,.·ell located within the area spaced 
under the Order issued in (.'.lu:::.e No. 139-8. The above said 1o;ell was approved 
a.::; a 60-day test drilling well and the Division's letter disallo.,..ed simultaneous 
production of thC' tc<;t well and the Albert Sf'lith well which is presently 
under production, heyond the period of testing allowed by the Dnision. 
3. On Scrtcmher 2, 1980, the DHis1on received a letter from Peter 
Stirb:i on bch.1tf of h1s client s. H. Benn1on, a non-consenting land owner 
in this rn-ittcr, requesting th<? Dnision to take action pursuant to 40-6-9(c), 
U.C.A., 1953, w1th1n 10 dnys of rccc1pt of the letter to enjoin the dnll1ng 
of Gulf 1 s "lhcrt 5:-:nth 2-RC.S ... ·ell as being in violat10n of the Board's 
orJ".'r 1'1 C;iu."-c \o. 139-8. 
] I I • I I I \ '. ' 
I'\ I I ( \.' ! 
11• 1 th :T the h<·:1rd .1nd not the flJ\ is ion haJ author1ty to grant injunctive 
' r < r ]', ' ) 11 I l J 11 '.: . 
'.-t J rb.1 ..Jrr1 :ircJ on bch:df of h1s cl1cnt S. fl, Bennion to request 
: 1 t 1 t 1 ( 1; ( f fr or thC' TI1 J rJ .Jl;J ica l D1 strict Court to stop the dnl I ing 
'.lt'"t .:'-.SCS 1-:ell on SC'ptcmbcr 1980. 
1. 111'1 :he Di1 J<;1 '1.11c author1t;. to tr. e.xcept1on 
],, 1t1011 t,, ill01, th( d1illing of a tc·<;t 1o-cll Pus m<"lttcr" 
c. 1 J,I the i\lhc11 S'711th .::'-BC.3 l•>cl J be 
111 Jl"l]1T1('Tl "f the Bo;ird OrJcr in 
c, lt ..!1l-G-('ll !1.(.A., I9S3:' 
from operation 
i\o. 139-8, 
If, in the ::irrro1:il to Jnll the Jnf1JJ test 
11 "'i-. •l; r:r •r,tld, 1o-h.Jt ::illocation of costs shoulJ 
n.1 1 e '-'11 to pr0Juct1on of ;..·ell"' 
(0·.1c lus1ons of 1.::i.;.. 
,-... r•cril r11r)'l"l<;( ::inJ lntcnt of the 01J and Gas Con;;.enat1on Act. 
"Iii· P-oirJ anJ !l1'.J<;J0n of Clil. Gas and .ire• ch:lrged b) 
1, 11 .1 ll':;nncr .1.<- 1o-1l l prc\cnt ···•J.<;tc, to Juth0r1:l' 
'1"•1 le fo1 ore1:1t1on:o ;rnd of c.il :rnJ 
,"' 11'.l 
i:1 ,1.:h .1 m:rnncr th.·,-:. .J .:er L,;)tirr ... tc 
: 0, I 1rcl g :-i;_iy he .111d th;_it the 
J,1.., ol ,1 J l 0i.·n( r::- liCfUTly 
1Scct ion ..in-l•-1, LI(.,\ . 
. 1Jthdl 
.i· ire· of the fad th.rt ,1rrlic.1t1ori of present 
J '·'.! c•:·:i;y ,\··r, 
ug! 1 : g fl) SllC\1 
( \llS/ \t). l ·' 
Sn 
C. Cr,1i... \ 11" 10n -----
hJ\T J n:rnd.iti.. unJcr Sc(t1on of the 011 and GJs Con<;cnat1on 
·\ct to n1x11T11sc rcLO\Cr.1 of oil and r,:as from the Bluebell 
l-ii..lJ. ruithcr, the B01rJ f1nds that the D1v1s1on 1o1as ·.onthin the 
scopi..· of its dclcptcd authority to appro\·e the Albert Sm1th 
SCS :1:0 :in inf1 11 test .,.cl I. 
11. the Alhcrt S:nith :-scs .,.ell be CnJ01ncd from operat1on 
bc1r-,i::, 1 i0::1t:on of :he Board's Order ln [Jusc "'o. 139-8'.' 
The rJ.11nt1ff h;is asserted that the D1\1s1on's approval of 
.-.nC r".111''.c. drilling of thC' ·\lb-:rt Smith t2-8CS infill test '-'ell 
be cn101nl'J .is \10L1tnc of the Board's Order in Cause Ne. 
rr .. 11"l .r- th:1t 'I' ri.,\.Jl :rnJ Jr1ll1nb of the !:>C1..011d well, /\lbcrt 
th.it 
to the rrC>\lSlOns of this Act, the Order 
dnll1nr units shall direct thzit no more 
tl1.:" c.:rc 1.cll sl,.1Jl he Jrilled fc,r pn,duct1on fron the 
cw·.n"'1 of st:r)'l) on ciny ur11t (fmrhas1!:> ad<.lc<.l) 
q1:1ult r1..0wl; 1.1th the Alben Smnh q-8CS production.,.,,('}] after 
: ( -: IC' i0J. l t ... le..ir th.it the sec,,nd .,.,,ell \lOl.Jtcs 
C1 !"-( 'c. E ncr ..in-t,-li'.c; 
l. 11.!, .... otl-il'l":"c .1u:hor1:.cd h) li-il 0f (nl, !' .. 1.<:. 
:ind 'l·n;11; iori .. 111 be- Jirr,1tcC tc the /llbtrt ""'.tl-. 
•-'l:, .,.,('jj t<'T thl' Jfrl''\Cd tcst1nt; rcric•d 
:lllrcf, 
r , c r • h , 1 '11>Juct10r, "'ell, the continued opcrat1e<r. r·f th.1t "tll 
I \'.11 
1 f.I rn \, ( \11".>f 
\i' 
1;1. f \l .. 11!1111· 
t0 r:l\ ·'".\ 0f the LOsts of d11ll1n& such at this time, ... ·hether 
t 11l 1Hll is ::i dry hole or a producin.!,-: hole operating during 
\ftcr pi·nrcr notl(C ,1nJ hearing, the Ro.trd could dcsignJtc 
thL 1,u]f tC'<;t \..C]) for rroJuCtJOn lf the l•OCJ} SUbst<intially impTO\'eS 
· c-1; rJf llll ,11J p!- from thE Bluebell Altamont Field. Such 
prrJucing 1.:cll for the u•nt, '' ?.s an order dcs1gn:Jting 
th 'L'-l \..l)l .1"- the producing .,.•ell in ;.i dTillin& unit of dccrc:ised 
,J11J .1nJ i;,su:incc of ::i Bodrd Order designJ.ting the Albert 
-:::-:sc:;; :!" .1 produc1n& .,.ell, the pl::i1nt1ff, ::i::. a non-ccnscnting 
• 11, r.f t 1·c 1·lll under C:.cct1on ll.C.A.., 1953, :ind imrlcmcnting 
ORPI R 
1 ,, nt ;tl">C'r the !10;1rd OidC'r in C .. u-.c "o. 139-S nor 
ThLfL'fC'rC', pr0Juct1on of well for the 
nTllCL\(l n1-:11r1< ,\\'II 
0Rl'I..: TO Sll1l',\ r \llSL 
C\US[ l.;ri __ 'LI 
_L'.L' I I .i::ht 
Bo.:irJ of Oil, r..1"' ;rnd :15 a produc111g 1<o'C'll, the riarnt1ff "'hClll not 
:ind .. dc-q•111tc:::. the 1<>Tll a product1on lo'C'll, the l'l.:11nt1ff 
<..h.Jrc of the ..:oq o: the 1-<.clJ pur5uant to applicable la .... ·s and regul<1t1ons 
th· :1llt'(,1t1on of such costs. If the Albert S1111th 11'2-8CS i,..cJI is 
.I rrr•Juct nn .... C'!J, <'.d} Oil and b35 rrodUCCd durinf? the tC'St 
J5'-11rd on .in emeq:.cncy ba.SJs pursu:int to Section 40-
\ot Cl' hc:(h; g1\en that any ob.1ect1on to this Order must be 
rcccl\cJ !r1J.1\·, CL·:...,c·r i-, ;1 ... to \.<.hy the Bo:trd shoulJ not accept this 
:it 10.\IU 1n \11ldl1fc Rr:->0urccs Aud1toriurn, IS96 h'est Temple, 
''1:11 
S'.f O! :,rR:::ri .-:.1J d:iy of October, 1980, by the Bo3rd of Oil, Ga:::. and 
Ch.11 I '.' 0 1, llcnJr r:-c1 n 
Ch inn.in 
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----00000----
s. H. Bennion, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Gulf Oil Corporation, a Pennsylvania 
Corporation and the Utah State Board 
of Oil, Gas & Mining, an agency of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
HOWE, Justice: 
F I L E D 
Auq..:st 19, 1985 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Appellant s. H. Bennion appeals from a su:mmary . 
j udg::-.ent granted in favor of respondents Gulf oil Corporation 
and the Utah State Board of oil Gas and Mining. He seeks 
reversal of the judgment and that sur..=.ary judgment in 
his favor should have been granted. 
Bennion holds mineral interests which without his 
consent were made part of an oil drilling unit by 
the Board, as permitted by the Oil and Gas conservation Act, 
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 40-6-1 to -19 (198l). By a 1972 orde: of the 
Board, Gulf was the producer authorized to drill the single 
production well allowed on the 640-acre unit. As a 
no:-,consenting interest owner, Bennion was entitled under the 
act to his proportionate share of the oil and gas produced 
from the unit minus his proportionate share of the cost of 
drilling, production, and maintenance. 
Gulf drilled a producing well on the 640-acre.unit 
and recouped its drilling costs. Bennion was thus entitled to 
receive and in fact was receiving his proportionate :hare of_ 
the oil and gas produced on the unit minus the r:latively low 
cost of oroduction and maintenance. Witbout notice or 
hearing,· but with pen;,ission given by a staff engineer the 
Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining on August 25, 19BO, "th" 
drilling a second well as an infill test wel. 
the 640-acre unit. Bennion petitioned the Board f e 
drilling on the basis that a second well was in vio.a ion ° 
the Oil and Gas Conservation Act and the Board's of 
unitization order. The Board determined that 
a second well as a test well was not in violation ° .i , . . 11 Bennion was orcer and that, inasmuch as it was a test we ' ver the 
not required to pay any of its drilling costs. ll as a 
Ecard added that if it were to redesignate the.te: his 
well, Bennion would then be responsibl Gulf "shut 
proportionate share of those costs. 11 
l_n" the first well and applied to have the secon we 
designated as the production well. After a hearing, the Board 
changed the designation of the second well from a test well to 
that of the unit's production well and ordered Bennion to pay 
his share of the $1.4 million drilling cost. Bennion appealed 
the Board's order to the district court. 
Pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 40-6-lO(b), appellant was 
entitled on his appeal to a determination of the "issues on 
both questions of law and fact" by the district court. on the 
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 
determined from the transcript of the hearing before the Board 
that the Board had acted properly and within its authority. 
sur..:nary judgi;ient in favor of Gulf was entered. 
For purposes of this opinion, we shall assume that 
the Oil and Gas Conservation Act allows a staff engineer to 
authorize the drilling of a test well on a producing unit. We 
note that the issue is raised, but not argued, in the briefs 
of counsel and that the act is not clear on the issue. See 
U.C.A., 1953, § 40-6-3. However, even assuming that 
statute allows such a delegation of authority, we cannot agree 
with the district court's of the Board's order 
redesignating the test well as the production well and holding 
Bennion responsible for a proportionate share of the cost of 
drilling the second well. 
Although the Oil and Gas Conservation Act was first 
enacted in 1955, we have had little opportunity to construe 
its provisions. A cursory reading of the act discloses, 
however, that in at least two places it is contemplated that 
only one well should be drilled per unit. For example, 
section 40-6-6(b) provides: 
In establishing a drilling unit, the 
acreage to be embraced within each unit 
and the shape thereof shall be determined 
by the board from the evidence introduced 
at the hearing but shall not be 
nor greater than the maximum area that can 
be efficiently and economically drained .ey 
one well. 
(Emphasis added.) Subsection (c) provides: 
subject to the provisions of this act, the 
order establishing drilling units shall 
direct that no more than one well shall be 
drilled for production from colTll!1on 
source of supply on any unit .... 
(Emphasis added.) We find nothing in the act which expressly 
allows a test well to displace the production well from a 
COlllll\On source of supply on the unit. The only reference to 
the drilling of additional wells is found in subsection (d) 
where it is provided: 
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When found necessary for the prevention of 
waste, or to avoid the drilling of 
unnecessary wells, or to protect 
correlative rights, an order establishing 
drilling units in a pool may be modified 
by the board to increase the size of 
drilling units in the pool or any zone 
thereof, to decrease the size of drilling 
units or to permit the drilling of 
additional wells on a reasonably uniform 
plan in the pool, or any zone thereof. 
The Board's order in the instant case did not purport to 
comply with this subsection. The order did not authorize the 
drilling of additional wells on a uniform plan "in the pool or 
any zone thereof." 
The Board made its order approving. the second well as 
the production well for the unit and charging Bennion for his 
proportionate share of the cost of drilling in reliance on 
section 40-6-1, which is entitled "Declaration of Public 
Interest:" 
It is declared to be in the public 
interest to foster, encourage, and promote 
the development, production, and 
utilization of natural resources of oil 
and gas in the state of Utah in such a 
manner as will prevent waste; to authorize 
and to provide for the operation and 
development of oil and gas properties in 
such a manner that a greater ultimate 
recovery of oil and gas may be obtained 
and that the correlative rights of all 
owners be fully protected; to encourage, 
authcrize, and provide for voluntary 
agreements for cycling, recycling, 
pressure maintenance, and secondary 
recovery operations in order that the 
greatest possible economic recovery of oil 
and gas may be obtained within the state 
the end that the land owners, the 
royalty owners, the producers, and the 
general public may realize and enjoy the 
greatest possible good from these vital 
natural resources. 
The Board further justified its action on its finding that the 
first well at the time it was shut in was at the point of 
r:arginal recovery of further oil or gas or both of them. At 
the hearing before the Board, Gulf introduced production . 
reoorts of the second well for the first three months of its 
operation which showed higher production than the first well. 
!jo·.·ever, Gulf qid not know if the second well would be a 
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co:::nr.iercial well or even if its total production would exceed 
that which would still be produced by the first well. Gulf's 
expert witness testified: 
We have no idea of what the extent of the 
reservoir is. We can't know that at this 
time. We realize that this whole field 
is--apparently the reservoir due to the 
geological structure of the thing--it's 
almost impossible to determine what's 
going to happen from one well to the next 
as far as correlating sands and production. 
We acknowledge the legislative mandate in section 
40-6-1 to promote the development of our state's oil and gas 
res0urces. We do not believe, however, that the broad 
declaration of public interest contained therein was meant to 
override the specific statutory restrictions on the drilling o: 
an additional well on any unit.l Y,oreover, we note that the 
declaration of public interest calls for "the greatest possible 
economic recovery of oil and which provides the basis fc: 
Bennion's complaint that the evidence is lacking as to whether 
the second well will ever pay out. We also note the legis-
lative intent expressed in section 40-6-6(a) that the drilling 
of unnecessary wells be avoided. Thus, aside from the fact 
that there does not appear to be any statutory authority for 
the action of the Board, the evidence was insufficient to 
demonstrate that it was more equitable or reasonable to shut in 
the first well and redesignate the second well as the pro-
duction well. More importantly, the evidence fails to justify 
the trampling of a nonconsenting mineral interest owner's 
correlative rights in charging him with the added and 
speculative expense of drilling the second well. 
We have examined Gulf's res judicata defense and fine 
it to be without merit. 
The Board erred in its redesicrnation of the second 
well as the production well for the unit, and the district 
court erred in affirming the Board's order. We vacate the 
Board's order in cause number 139-20(8) and the cause tc 
the Board with the instruction to enter an order that the 
second well is and has been producing in violation of u.c.A., 
1953, § 40-6-6(e) and relieve Bennion of all obligation to 
share in the cost of drilling. 
1. In 1983, two years after the hearing be:cre the Board in 
the instant case, extensive amendments were rnade to the Oil 
and Gas Conservation Act. Properly, we have not considered 
them in our analysis and decision. 
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Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zinunennan, Justice 
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result. 
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